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The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Paradigm
in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform
by
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS*
The global financial crisis has exposed the many limits of disclosure as an
effective regulatory tool in financial markets. First, the famed disciplining
power of the market failed to constrain disastrous risk taking by banks. Second,
most of the risks that led to the creation of the 2008 catastrophe were often fully
disclosed but the markets failed to understand them. In the case of banks,
disclosure-based market discipline failed mainly because of the implicit
government guarantee. In the case of capital markets, the reasons for
disclosure’s failure were product complexity and the impact of socio-
psychological factors. Yet much of European Financial Regulation is based
on the disclosure paradigm to remedy market failure, discipline market actors,
improve investor/consumer choice, and prevent abuse. The EU needs to re-
examine the role of disclosure in two contexts: prudential regulation of banks
and retail investor protection. EU policy-makers should use empirical and
experimental studies before any reform of the investor protection framework.
Insertion of default options in a variety of financial contracts may be a
necessary supplement to disclosure for retail investors. Furthermore, an
independent EU financial products committee would be a better regulatory
protection strategy than reliance on investor choice assisted by enhanced
disclosure.
* Reader in International Financial Law, School of Law, University of Manchester. This
paper is based on research funded by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council
(AHRC) and was completed while spending time as the Global Capital Markets Center
Fellow at the School of Law, Duke University. A first version of the paper was presented
in the conference of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and
EUROFRAME, ‘Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis’, London, British
Academy, 12 June 2009. I am greatly indebted to Professor Julia Black of the LSE and
Jeremy Cooper and Pamela Hanrahan of the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission for very constructive comments and critical encouragement.
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I. Introduction
1. Overview
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the systemic threats created by the
financial troubles of European banks and their cross-border spillover
implications exposed the many gaps in the supervision of EU based banks.
It also uncovered loopholes in other parts of European financial regulation.1
Several policy initiatives are under way to remedy most of the observed
defects in EC financial regulation. Chief among them is the Commission
proposal for the adoption of the recommendations of the de Larosiere
Committee for the macro-prudential and micro-prudential regulation of
financial institutions in the EU.2 Other legislative initiatives pertain to the
1 For the purposes of this article EC financial regulation encompasses EC banking
regulation, EC securities regulation, and the laws pertaining to the supervision of
insurance firms and marketing of retail insurance products. For a description of the
boundaries and objectives of European securities regulation see Niamh Maloney, EC
Securities Regulation (OUP, 2nd edition, 2008) 1, 8, 24.
2 ‘Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’, 25 February 2009.
The de Larosiere Committee recommendations were incorporated in a Commission
Communication. See Commission (EC), ‘European Financial Supervision’ (Communi-
cation) COM(2009) 252 final, 27 May 2009. The European Council of 18/19 June 2009
endorsed the de Larosiere Committee proposals. Council of the European Union,
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licensing and supervision of hedge fund operators3 and of credit rating
agencies.4 Yet the crisis has also exposed the many problems associated with
the disclosure based model of investor protection that predominates EU
financial regulation.
Since the enactment of so-called US New Deal Statutes: mainly Securities Act
19335 and Securities and Exchange Act 1934,6 mandating extensive disclosure
requirements imposed on securities issuers and underwriters to battle fraud
and market abuse, disclosure has been seen as the cornerstone of any investor
protection regime in securities markets. As a result, EC Securities Directives
have fully incorporated the disclosure paradigm.7 However, disclosure’s
ascent to the ‘regulatory Olympus’ in the past twenty five years was the
product of considerations that had little to do with the battle against fraud and
market abuse.
With the advent of financial liberalization and with the aid of modern finance
theory, but not with its full endorsement, policy-makers and regulators came
to view financial markets as an agglomeration of rational investors, who make
optimal resource allocation and wealth maximization decisions, when
provided with sufficient information and appropriately structured economic
incentives. So all regulators had to do to safeguard efficient markets and help
investors was to ensure that a vast volume of pertinent information entered the
public domain in any given area of financial market activity. Provision of
information to rational actors would then allow the market to self-regulate
avoiding to large extent public intervention.
To put it simply, it was assumed that on the basis of all available information,
market actors would adjust their investment decisions, positions, and
strategies to information’s content and with the aid of arbitrage efficient
‘Brussels European Council 18/19 June 2009 – Presidency Conclusions’ 19 June 2009,
11225/09, available at<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/en/ec/108622.pdf>.
3 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2004/39/
EC and 2009/…/EC’, COM(2009) 207 final, 30 April 2009.
4 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on Credit Rating Agencies’ COM(2008) 704 final, 12 November 2008.
5 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77 mm (1994).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to 78 mm (1994).
7 E.g. , Directive (EC) 2003/71 on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading [2003] OJ L 345/64 [hereinafter the
Prospectus II Directive]; Directive (EC) 2004/109 on the Harmonization of Trans-
parency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market [2004] OJ L390/38; Directive (EC) 2003/6
on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L 96/16; Council
Directive (EC) 2004/39 on Markets in Financial Instruments [2004] OJ L 145/1 (MiFID).
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markets would be perpetuated, in accordance with the main assumptions of
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH),8 which is a direct application of rational
choice theory9 to market behaviour. Thus, no further consideration was
usually given to other very important issues, such as the question whether
market actors used all of the disclosed information and if so what kind of
decisions they took on the basis of abundant supplies of information.
Based on the rational investor model, modern financial regulation has
stretched the disclosure paradigm and reliance on self-regulation far beyond
its original realm of issuer disclosure and prevention of market abuse to
financial services consumer (retail investor) protection and prudential
regulation of banks with mixed results. For example, the third pillar of
Basle II10 (market discipline) mandates extensive disclosure obligations for
banks operating under this framework, on the assumption that timely
informed rational actors are capable to act as de facto supervisors and
enforcers of prudential regulation rules. Essentially, Basle II gave to market
self-regulation a crucial and strategic role in pricing risk11 and preventing
institutional collapses and systemic crises.12 The EU fully endorsed that view
8 See from the very extensive literature Paul Samuelson, ‘Proof that Properly Anticipated
Prices Fluctuate Randomly’ (1965) 6 Industrial Management Review 41 and Benoit
Mandelbrot, ‘Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models’
(1966) 39 Journal of Business 242. For a re-formulation of EMH to strong, semi-strong,
and weak form, depending on the amount of private information that is publicly
available, and empirical testing see Eugene F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of Finance 383; Fama,
‘Efficient Capital Markets II’ (1991) 46 Journal of Finance 1575.
9 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in Friedman, Essays in
Positive Economics (University of Chicago Press, 1953), 3.
10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework’, Updated November
2005, [hereinafter Basel II Accord].
11 For very insightful criticism of the pro-cyclical bias of (draft) Basel II standards and of
its undue reliance on credit ratings, which was ultimately overseen with undesirable
consequences, see Jon Danielson, Paul Embrechts, Charles Goodhart et al. ‘An
Academic Response to Basel II’, LSE Financial Markets Group, Special Paper, 130, June
2001, available at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/fmg.pdf> accessed on 20 June 2009.
12 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Transparency Group, ‘Working Paper
on Pillar 3 – Market Discipline’, September 2001, available at
http://www.fma.gv.at/cms/basel2//attachments/6/3/9/CH0329/
CMS1143022409903/bcbs_wp7.pdf.
‘The New Basel Capital Accord is based around three complementary elements or
“pillars”. Pillar 3 recognises that market discipline has the potential to reinforce
minimum capital standards (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2), and so
promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. Market discipline imposes
strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner,
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by premising the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)13 on the Basle II
framework.14 CRD provides the foundations of EU’s harmonized prudential
regulation regime, which governs the licensing and supervision of banks by
member state authorities.
Given the predominance of the rational investor model on policy-makers’,
analysts’, and regulators’ thinking, it is not surprising that mis-aligned
incentives and inadequate disclosure have been widely cited as almost the sole
cause of the global financial crisis.15 The inadequate disclosure critique has
not, however, been fully endorsed by all analysts of the global financial crisis.
A significant minority of commentators have argued that closer examination
shows that investors had in many cases sufficient information about the risks
of their investment strategies and of the financial products used to implement
them.16 Yet market actors could not properly process available information in
those cases and adjust their positions to the riskiness of structured credit
securities for a variety of reasons.
First, due to product complexity, boundedly rational investors failed to
understand the mechanics and risks of shadow banking and structured credit
securities.17 Second, because of market players’ tendency to herd, responding
strategically to other market actors’ behaviour, these did not have the capacity
or the desire to use in a rational way the disclosed information and take
contrarian positions. Third, the influence of other behavioural factors such as
the use of heuristics,18 and investor overconfidence in times of market
including an incentive to maintain a strong capital base as a cushion against potential
future losses arising from risk exposures.’ (Emphasis added), Id.
13 The consolidated Capital Requirements Directive comprises European Parliament and
Council Directive (EC) 2006/48 for the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit
Institutions [2006] OJ L 177/1 and European Parliament and Council Directive (EC)
2006/49 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions [2006]
OJ L 177/201.
14 Pillar 3 of the Basel II Framework is reflected in rec. 62, Arts 145 –149, and Annex XII
of Directive 2006/48.
15 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWGFM), ‘Policy Statement on
Financial Market Developments’, March 2008.
16 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis’ (2008) Utah
Law Review 1109. Schwarcz accurately notes: ‘In the subprime mortgage crisis, there is
to date relatively little dispute that the disclosure documents describing MBS, CDO,
and ABS CDO securities and their risks generally complied with the federal securities
laws.’ Id. 1113.
17 Steven Schwarcz, ‘Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown’ (2008) 93 Minnesota L. Rev. 373.
18 An excellent analysis of the limitations that financial product complexity posed for
investors’ understanding of them and the catastrophic consequences of this limited
understanding is given in Steven Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial
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euphoria, because of abundance of easy credit and rising market prices, meant
that investors chose to ignore the warning signals in the disclosed data in
favour of over-reliance on credit ratings.19 Arguably, the view taken by this
second group of commentators makes the inadequate disclosure argument a
much less powerful explanation of the global financial crisis.
2. Reconsidering the Disclosure Paradigm in EC Financial Regulation
This article sets to investigate whether the standing of disclosure as the
centrepiece of EU financial regulation is justified in the post global financial
crisis era. In this context, it opens two lines of enquiry. First, it examines the
constraints that disclosure-based market discipline faces in being an effective
tool of systemic stability regulation. Second, it considers the value of extensive
disclosure to retail investors under conditions of complexity. In this context, it
discusses the impact of socio-psychological factors on investor decision-
making, including cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and herding.
Consequent to this analysis, the article argues that EU policy makers should
try to understand disclosure’s limitations and devise alternative strategies. In
the case of systemic stability regulation, disclosure-based market discipline
needs to be rethought, as it may not be a good alternative to strict protective
rules, such as institutional segregation of commercial and investment banking
and position limits, which would also contain the ‘too big to fail’
phenomenon. In the field of securities regulation, enhanced disclosure
standards may prove beneficial in certain areas, chiefly in the regulation of
short sales. However, in other areas, and especially in the field of retail
investor protection regulation, it is suggested that disclosure’s impact may be
rather limited.
Thus, EU policy-makers should consider the implementation of two pressing
reforms, either as complementary or even as alternative (substitutable)
measures. The first reform pertains to the introduction of sub-divisions in the
retail investor (or non-professional or consumer) class, envisaged in MiFID,20
in the Distance Marketing Directive (concerning promotions of consumer
financial services through the use of a distance communication medium),21 the
Markets’, Duke Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 217, revised
February 26, 2009.
19 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial
Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies
121.
20 MiFID, Art. 19 and Annex II.
21 European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance
marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive (EEC) 90/
The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure ParadigmECFR 4/2009 445
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recast UCITS Directive,22 and the Public Offer Prospectus Directive II.23 This
should be followed by tailor made disclosure requirements with respect to the
public offer of securities, the provision of investment advice, and investment
promotions for each retail investor sub-class. As this solution may, in practice,
prove expensive or impractical, the second reform refers to the establishment
of an independent EU body that would scrutinize financial products
addressed to the retail investor market and recommend default options. In
both cases the extensive use of empirical studies, complemented by properly
calibrated economic experiments,24 would considerably improve the effec-
tiveness of EU regulation in this area. Such improvement is of colossal
importance to the EU, as its ever ageing population25 increasingly relies on
retail financial products to ensure acceptable living standards in retirement.
The paper is divided in five sections. The first section is the present
introduction. The second section provides a concise overview of the main
welfare benefits of disclosure rules under the rational investor model. It also
examines the limitations of disclosure regulation under the lens of behavioural
decision theory. It explains why investors’ flawed use of information, due to
socio-psychological factors, built many of the conditions that led to the global
financial crisis. The third section examines the role of disclosure-based market
discipline in EU banking regulation. It explains why excessive reliance on
market discipline was the wrong approach to protect both against individual
institution failure and against a systemic crisis. The fourth section examines
the role of disclosure regulation within the EU retail investor protection
619/and Directives (EC) 97/7 and 98/27 [2002] OJ L 271/16. For an analysis of the ambit
of the consumer protection regime established by this Directive and its relationship
with the retail investor used by MiFID see Maloney (n 1), 574– 581.
22 ‘Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the coordina-
tion of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS)(recast)’, 2008/0153 (COD), 19
June 2009.
23 The Prospectus Directive II (Art. 3(2)(a)) exempts issuers of securities from an
obligation to issue a prospectus when, inter alia, the offer is solely addressed to
‘qualified investors’ (defined in Art. 2(1)(e) &(f) & Art. 2(2)). Thus, by implication, the
Directive divides investors to ‘qualified’ (professional and institutional) investors and
‘public’ (retail) investors.
24 See for an overview of experimental methods to test legal rules Colin Camerer and Eric
Talley, ‘Experimental Study of Law’ in A. Michell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds.),
Handbook of Law and Economics, (North-Holland, 2007), 1619– 1650.
25 Estimates made by respectable institutions indicate that by 2050 the EU’s pensioner
population will be more than 100 million and the number of workers for every
individual of 65-plus will fall from more than three to fewer than two. See Gary Duncan,
Ageing Population Brings Grave Problems’, The Times, 25 June 2007, available at
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article1980413.ece> ac-
cessed on 8 July 2009.
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regime. It offers two proposals for the reform of European financial products
regulation placing the role of disclosure on a more effective and realistic
footing. The fifth section brings the different strands of the present discussion
to a comprehensive conclusion.
II. Disclosure Regulation, the Global Financial Crisis,
and the Behavioural Decision Theory Critique
1. Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool and the Global Financial Crisis
Disclosure has been regarded as the most potent tool of corporate and
financial market regulation for seven reasons26: (a) it increases publicly
available information enabling market actors to make informed investment
decisions, (b) it improves market efficiency: increased availability of
information leads to better pricing of securities and of other financial
instruments enhancing allocative efficiency, (c) it reduces the cost of
information searches, which, when excessive, are pure social waste in zero
sum securities markets; (d) it fosters fair, ethical, and competitive markets, as it
obliterates (along with prohibitions of insider dealing) the information
advantage that insiders enjoy over public investors in financial markets, (e) it
may help market stability by containing market volatility that is usually
caused by limited information regarding the merits or risks of financial
products, (f) it promotes market discipline, and (g) it deters fraud.
Arguably, some of the aforementioned benefits of disclosure regulation not
only are undisputable but also have served multiple causes. For instance,
mandatory (securities issuer) disclosure has both helped to improve the
integrity of securities markets and to advance the cause of democratic
capitalism by eradicating the information advantages of the established
economic elites, where corporate insiders normally belong.
However, the above benefits are not the sole reason explaining why disclosure
has become the cornerstone of modern financial regulation. And it is neither
26 For an overview of the many studies that provide an economic analysis of the merits and
de-merits of disclosure regulation see Emilios Avgouleas, The Mechanics and
Regulation of Market Abuse, A Legal and Economic Analysis (OUP, 2005) 173 –183.
The two most convincing academic analyses in favour of disclosure regulation are John
Coffee ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’,
(1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 717 and James Cox, ‘Insider Trading and Contracting:
A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”’ (1986) Duke Law Journal 628. Other
authors have dismissed the benefits of mandatory disclosure mostly because of the high
costs it entails. E.g. , Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors’ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 669.
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because it is an inexpensive or non-intrusive regulatory technique. It is both
very costly and intrusive for the subject of relevant disclosure requirements.
Regardless of context, e. g., periodic issuer disclosure, offer prospectus etc. , an
army of expensive auditors, lawyers, and compliance officers are assigned the
task of processing and verifying disclosable information. As mentioned in the
first section, disclosure’s ascent is rather the result of deregulation and the
latter’s reliance on the rational investor model and self-regulation; hence, the
pre-eminence of rational choice theory in modern financial regulation.
In one way or another rational choice theory proposes that human agents
strive to maximize their utility from a stable set of well-defined preferences
accumulating, in the process, an optimal amount of information and other
inputs in a variety of contexts.27 Thus, in the face of uncertain outcomes,
individuals will choose a decision or a course of action that maximizes
expected utility, so called expected utility hypothesis.28 The ‘homo econom-
icus’ is supposed to act to maximize expected utility, because his/her
preferences are given, consistent, and representable in the form of a utility
function.
Provision of information becomes very important in this model of decision-
making, because, where individuals operate under conditions of uncertainty
about the results of their actions, they are assumed to be able to assess the
probability distribution in accordance with their level of knowledge. If new
information can be collected from the environment and individuals know the
information’s possible content they assess it, in accordance with Bayes’ law,
by calculating the probability distribution based on the interplay between the
new information’s content and their prior knowledge.
As mentioned in section I, given the predominance of rational investor model,
it is not surprising that inadequate disclosure is thought to be main generator
of the conditions which led to the global financial crisis. In specific, inadequate
disclosure has been identified in five areas of market activity that have been
closely linked to the creation and amplification of the global financial crisis:
(a) inadequate disclosure of risks to subprime borrowers, (b) opacity of highly
structured financial products, which also incorporated very complex pricing
formulas, and sometimes possible obfuscation by financial institutions of the
27 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (University of
Chicago Press, 1976), 14 and Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed., 2003),
chs. 1 –3.
28 This hypothesis was first clearly expressed by Daniel Bernoulli in ‘Exposition of a New
Theory on the Measurement of Risk’ originally published in 1738 and reproduced in
(1954) 22 Econometrica 23. It was further refined in John Von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton University Press,
1944).
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risks associated with such products, inspite of relevant legal and regulatory
requirements, (c) inadequate disclosure by financial institutions of their on-
and off-balance sheet exposures, (d) inadequate disclosure by Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs) of the limitations of credit ratings and their conflicts of
interest, and (e) inadequate disclosure of the short-termist nature of executive
and trader compensation.
It is an undisputable fact that as regards structured credit products lack of
standardization and limited, if not non-existent, disclosure meant that the
market had considerable difficulty to fill the gaps and properly evaluate the
risks of those securities. Thus, it could not price them with any degree of
accuracy. Moreover, in the highly complex and fast moving environment of
global financial markets it is easy for regulators to make the wrong choice
regarding the kind of data that has to be disclosed. Thus, either because of the
pro-cyclical nature of Basle Capital Adequacy standards29 or of the poorly
thought of supervisory focus on institutional capital adequacy (micro-
prudential),30 instead of the systemic implications of institutions’ behaviour
(macro-prudential), financial intermediaries were not requested to make any
kind of assessment of the systemic implications of their business activities nor
did they have to disclose such assessment.
However, in other areas there was considerable disclosure of information
regarding the risk of investment products and techniques that have been
highly implicated in the building up and amplification of the global financial
crisis. In those cases, market actors either did not read properly the warning
signals or did not understand or acted on the disclosed information. There
seem to be three areas of protective regulation where disclosure did not work
as expected: (a) risk assessment/management, (b) prudential regulation/
systemic stability, (c) consumer protection. These disclosure failures are
analytically discussed in the next few paragraphs, after first discussing the
main assumptions of behavioural decision theory (BDT), on is based the
alternative to insufficient disclosure explanation of the global financial crisis.31
29 See in general, Markus Brunnermeier, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, Avinash
D. Persaud, and Hyun Shin, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’,
Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, January 2009, ch. 4. [Hereinafter the
Geneva Report}.
30 Martin Hellwig, ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis’, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2008/43, November 2008, 56 –60.
31 Andrew Lo, ‘Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2008’
(2009) 1 Journal of Financial Economic Policy 5, 19 –21.
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2. Limitations of Disclosure Regulation
2.1. Prospect Theory, Experimental Economics, and Disclosure Regulation
As mentioned above under the rational investor model of regulation,
disclosure leads to informed investment decisions in accordance with investor
risk and return preferences. Rational and self-disciplined wealth maximizing
investors need large volumes of information in order to calculate the risk and
return probabilities of an investment, in order to maximize their expected
utility (expected profit) in accordance with their risk and return preferences.
This is also the first statement that would fall foul of a Prospect Theory
analysis of disclosure. Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory32 con-
stitutes the core of so-called psychology of choice and judgement, one of the
two pillars of Behavioural Decision Theory (BDT) (the other pillar is
experimental economics). Prospect Theory assumes, inter alia, that prefer-
ences are not constant and choice may be manipulated through the framing of
information. If the assumptions of Prospect Theory are correct, namely that
by changing a reference point human actors’ evaluation of gains and losses will
change and that in any case individuals’ ability to make actuarial calculations is
limited, then the utility of the provision of vast amounts of information to
especially retail investors looks much diminished. Disclosure seems even less
effective as a regulatory technique, if the effects of problem description or
framing33 are also taken into account. There is strong evidence that preferences
may change, depending on the wording of a problem.34 This essentially means
that individuals’ choices can be manipulated depending on the way relevant
information is presented. The effect of framing is stronger among the less
sophisticated members of any group.35 However, even thoughtfulness is not
sufficient to counter the effect of framing; thoughtful individuals are still in
need of a relevant cue in order to untangle the impact of framing.36 Kahneman
and Tversky’s and other behavioural psychologists findings have been
extensively utilized by so-called behavioural finance theorists to explain
why financial markets deviate so often and in so many contexts from the
32 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk’ (1979) 47 Econometrica 263.
33 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’
(1986) 59 Journal of Business S251-S278.
34 Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler, ‘A Survey of Behavioral Finance’ National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9222, 20 September 2002, 20,
recording a 30 %-40% shift in preferences, due to framing, in relevant studies.
35 R. A. LeBoeuf and E. Shafir, ‘Deep Thoughts and Shallow Frames: On the
Susceptibility to Framing Effects’ (2003) 16 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 77.
36 Ibid.
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fundamental assumptions of EMH, a series of phenomena that behavioural
economists call ‘anomalies’ or ‘puzzles’.37
Nonetheless, the above is not the full story. Neither the critical importance of
disclosure in promoting clean markets and protecting investors should be
easily dismissed nor should rational choice theory be proclaimed dead. In fact,
there is plenty of empirical and experimental evidence that validates and
refutes the assumptions of both BDT and rational choice theory. For example,
experimental economics shows that human activity is diffused and dominated
by unconscious, autonomic, neuropsychological systems.38 These enable
people to function effectively without always calling upon the brain’s scarcest
resource: attentional circuitry. However, through trial and error learning,
individuals may eventually make decisions that are compatible with expected
utility theory. For instance, experimental economics holds that, in compet-
itive markets, and financial markets are normally highly contested markets,
institutions (the rules of the game) matter, because they determine informa-
tion and private incentives.39 But the incentives to which people respond are
sometimes not those one would expect based on the canons of economic
theory. Thus, it is very doubtful whether financial incentives could act as
generalized substitutes to prescriptive regulation.40
This conflicting evidence leads to the plausible assumption that ‘human
decision-making is simply a more nuanced phenomenon than unitary-process
theories permit.’41 Thus, instead of focusing on the unitary theories of
decision-making like rational choice and prospect theory, it is better to
understand human decision-making as the product of multiple-processes.42
Individual cognitive processes may become dominant in different context-
specific situations and cross-context comparisons may potentially lead to
observed inconsistencies in behaviour.43
37 Barberis and Thaler (n 34).
38 See Vernon L Smith, Papers in Experimental Economics (Cambridge University Press,
1991) and John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth (eds), The Handbook of Experimental
Economics (Princeton University Press, 1995).
39 Vernon L Smith, ‘An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior’ (1962) 70
Journal of Political Economy 111.
40 For a summary of relevant studies see Gregory Mitchell, ‘Why Law and Economics’
Perfect Rationality Should not be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal
Incompetence’ (2002) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 67.
41 Jennifer H Arlen and Eric L Talley, ‘Introduction’, in Arlen and Talley (eds),
Experimental Law and Economics (Elgar, 2008) xix.
42 Ibid. xviii-xx.
43 Ibid. xviii.
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Accordingly, relevant research on investors’ use of disclosed information
would possibly show that sometimes new information is used in a deliberative
way leading to outcomes that are consistent with rational choice theory.
Other times, non-conscious (intuitive), automatic decision-making processes
will be found to account for market phenomena that do not fit with the
rational choice prescribed outcomes, so-called ‘market anomalies’ or ‘puz-
zles’.44 Because these automatic processes intervene, short-circuit, or overrule
deliberative processes they may develop into a cognitive bias, which induces
behaviour inconsistent with rational choice/expected utility theory.45
The above view abides well with the main assumptions of Andrew Lo’s
Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (ACH),46 which has, so far, offered the best
alternative to the battling rivals of efficient market hypothesis and behavioural
finance. ACH incorporates several of the assumptions of both theories in an
evolutionary framework. Lo submits that markets often can be efficient, but
with strong deviations caused by behavioural factors. These are caused by the
fact that, as explained above, market actors’ computational ability is limited
and cognitive biases do play a role in their investment decisions.47 The
predominant theme of ACH is that market actors ultimately struggle not for
optimal returns (as the EMH holds) – optimization is costly – but for survival,
like all living species in an evolutionary framework. Namely, ACH holds that
market actors behave sometimes rationally and other times irrationally
depending on which strategy suits best their struggle for survival. For the
reasons explained in the next few paragraphs, herding may easily become the
only survival strategy in a falling market even for professional (normally
rational) investors.
On the basis of the above analysis it appears that the more accurate assumption
is that markets are complex adaptive systems that encompass both rational and
quasi-rational actors.48 Therefore, only through the use of both empirical and
44 See Barberis and Thaler (n 34).
45 Arlen and Talley (n 41) xix, xx, xxviii.
46 Andrew Lo, ‘Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The Adaptive
Markets Hypothesis’ (2005) 7 Journal of Investment Consulting 21.
47 According to Lo the forms of market behaviour cited by behavioural finance as
contradicting the assumptions of EMH, such as loss aversion, overconfidence,
overreaction, and other cognitive biases, are merely evidence of an evolutionary
model of decision-making, where individuals in adapting to a changing environment
rely on past experiences (‘best guesses’), namely they use simple heuristics. Where
AMH differs from behavioural finance is in that it assumes that if the decision making
challenges that investors face remain stable, outcomes from the use of heuristics will
gradually adapt, leading in the process to nearly optimal results. Ibid.
48 See also Richard H. Thaler, ‘The End of Behavioral Finance’ (November/December
1999) Financial Analysts Journal 12, 12– 13.
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experimental studies the actual value of disclosure as a protective regulatory
technique can be properly ascertained. The findings of such studies should
guide the formulation of disclosure policies, techniques, and formats that truly
aid individual investor choice and market welfare.
2.2. Bounded Rationality and Herding as Barriers to Rational Reaction
to Disclosed Information
In addition to limitations in the use of information highlighted by Prospect
Theory, there are two other factors that seem to limit the effectiveness of
disclosure. First, bounded rationality49 may account for market actors’ limited
understanding of disclosed information regarding highly complex financial
instruments.50 Second, herding (strategic trading behavior), either due to peer
pressure or in response to career/reputational concerns, also means that
disclosed information is ignored in favour of the safer ‘follow the herd’
strategy.51 Thus, herding places a very powerful limitation to rational reaction
to disclosed information.
Because individuals are boundedly rational, as securitisation markets grew
and products became more complex, expert investors showed limited capacity
for understanding the disclosed mechanics and calculate the attendant risks of
structured credit products and for developing tools to value them. Instead,
investors replaced rigorous credit controls and valuation models with over-
reliance on credit ratings.
Furthermore, institutions’ herding has been recognized as one of the main
builders and amplifiers of the crisis in the review of Lord Turner (chairman of
the UK’s Financial Services Authority) into the causes of the global financial
crisis.52 Herding is often due to irrational exuberance. Yet it may also be
triggered by the ‘beauty contests’ described by Keynes,53 in their post-modern
form that intrinsically links them to the agency problem. This, in turn, may be
nothing else than AMH’s famed battle for survival.
49 This concept essentially, means that individuals have limited ability to process
information because of their limited computational ability and flawed memory. See
Herbert A. Simon, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’ (1955) 69 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 99; Simon, ‘Rationality as Process and Product of Thought’ (1978)
68 American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 1.
50 See Schwarcz (nn 16 – 18).
51 See Schwarcz (n 16) and Avgouleas (n 19).
52 FSA, The Turner Review, A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (March
2009).
53 John M Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Co, 1936), ch. 12.
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In much the same way that the corporate governance (separation of ownership
from control) dilemma was formulated, institutional investors’ money is
today managed by expert individuals, who allocate, as agents, the money of
their principals (so-called separation of brains from money). Their interests, as
in most principal-agent relationships, are not perfectly aligned and sometimes
diverge considerably. While shareholders or fund investors are concerned,
under the rational choice model, with an optimal mixture of risk and return
that ensures sustained profitability, bankers’ and fund managers’ concerns are
markedly different. They have to show that their performance is equal to or
better than the rest of the market.54 Performance affects bonus payments and
the bankers’ and fund managers’ tenure in the job.55 Individuals, who work for
institutional investors, are in the market in order to make money and save their
jobs and not in order to ‘correct’ prices through arbitrage trading, as the
Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes. As a result, they are very likely to
follow the herd,56 playing the ‘momentum game’57 in the hope that they will be
able to sell and materialize their gains, before markets fall. Thus, bankers,
traders, and fund managers concentrate on trades and trading techniques that
enable them, if not to beat the market, at least, not to post returns inferior to
the market average saving their jobs and compensation packages.58 Namely,
they resort to the safest short-term survival strategy disregarding the EMH
search for fundamental value. Such behaviour does not only undermine the
efficiency of market prices, but also underscores the limitations of disclosure,
as it shows that peer pressure and other survival concerns and not new
information are the decisive factor in traders’ behaviour.
54 For an analysis of the impact of the principal-agent relationship (within financial
institutions) on the failure of disclosure in the market for structured credit securities see
Schwarcz (n 16).
55 See Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison, ‘Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers’
(1999) 114 Quarterly Journal of Economics 389.
56 Paul Gompers and Andrew Metrick, ‘Institutional Investors and Equity Prices’ (2001)
116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 229; Russ Wermers, ‘Mutual Fund Herding and the
Impact on Stock Prices’ (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 58; see also David S. Scharfstein
and Jeremy C Stein, ‘Herd Behavior and Investment’ (1990) 80 American Economic
Review 465.
57 Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers, ‘Momentum Investment
Strategies, Portfolio Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior’
(1995) 85 American Economic Review 1088; David Hirshleifer and Siew H Teoh, ‘Herd
Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis’ (2003) 9(1)
European Financial Management 25– 66.
58 Paul M Healy and Krishna Palepu, ‘Governance and Intermediation Problems in
Capital Markets: Evidence from the Fall of Enron’ (2003) 17 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3.
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3. Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis and the BDT Critique
3.1. Risk Assessment
A recurring theme in every regulatory report on the causes of the global credit
crisis is the role of lax risk management controls within financial institutions.
The failures of internal risk management controls were concentrated in five
areas: (a) failing credit control and borrower vetting standards, (b) inability to
properly value positions in structured credit securities, (c) excessive reliance
on credit ratings inspite of their widely known shortcomings, (d) inadequate
use of information when this was provided, and (e) ignorance of senior bank
management of the true function of Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) and
thus of the institution’s actual exposure to them.59 The cause of some of these
failures, however, was not lack of information but inappropriate use of what
was disclosed, due, no less, to behavioural factors.
For example, institutional buyers and sellers of structured credit securities
used credit ratings in order to price them, when reliable price quotations were
unavailable.60 As a result, credit ratings came to play a key role in the
‘valuation of customized or illiquid structured credit products’.61 However,
these highly sophisticated market participants knew all too well that the
ratings produced by the major CRAs suffered several shortcomings.
First, they were built to measure. Namely, the issuers of the products were
using CRAs’ know how and software in order to build baskets of securities
that would ensure an AAA rating. Second, the insatiable appetite of global
markets for credit ratings and the fact that the relevant market was highly
oligopolistic – three major agencies: Standard & Poors, Fitch, and Moody’s
have traditionally dominated the market – meant that the industry suffered
from a considerable lack of incentives to seriously stress test credit ratings, a
fact that was well known to most market professionals.62 Third, CRAs were
59 PWGFM (n 15) 15.
60 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, ‘Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring
Financial Soundness’, April 2008, 55.
61 Ibid.
62 There is a lively debate in scholarship as to whether CRAs are or should be regarded as
gate-keepers, in the same way as auditors etc. See Frank Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit
Rating Agencies Are not Like Other Gatekeepers’ in Yasuyuki Fuchita and Robert E.
Litan, (eds.), Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? (Brookings
Institution Press, 2006) and Patrick C Leyens, ‘Unabhängigkeit der Informationsin-
termediäre zwischen Vertrag und Markt – Zur Dogmatik der Unabhängigkeit von
Abschlussprüfern, Finanzanalysten und Rating-Agenturen’ in Harald Baum, Andreas
M. Fleckner, Alexander Hellgardt, and Markus Roth, Perspektiven des Wirtschafts-
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often subject to considerable conflicts of interest, as the buyers of their ratings
were the issuers whose products they rated.63 Finally, asset value in the case of
securities is often intrinsically linked to the marketability/liquidity of a
financial product, but this parameter is not measured by credit ratings.
Of course, modellers and risk managers in most institutions understood very
well the implications of the absence of such information and yet chose to
continue relying on credit ratings. Arguably, there are two ways to explain
why big institutions chose to substitute proper analysis and due diligence for
‘a subscription to a ratings publication’.64 The rational choice explanation is
that, in order to economise in substantial research costs and thus facilitate
transactions, investors choose to ignore the known flaws of credit ratings. Yet
given how pronounced, serious, and well known were those flaws, this
explanation does not sound convincing. Therefore, the second explanation,
which highlights the behavioural aspects of investor reliance on credit ratings,
is also worth considering.
It is possible that investor ‘irrational’ reliance on credit ratings was the result
of the operation of the availability and representativeness heuristics. Namely,
market participants relying much more heavily on heuristics than on rational
computations decided that painstaking calculations of market value were not
necessary for structured credit products. There was no memory of serious
failures of the ratings process, since structured credit securities were
predominantly new products without long trading histories. On the contrary,
given also the prevailing conditions of market euphoria, credit ratings could
serve as a usable, although inaccurate, benchmark of value so that trading
could go on as normal generating sizeable returns. Namely, sophisticated
investors’ cognitive limitations and focus on short-term profit meant that they
chose to ignore the warning signals. This explains both the incredible amount
of trust placed on the ratings of CRAs and why these ‘had grown more
powerful than anyone intended’.65
rechts: Deutsches, Europäisches und Internationals Handels-, Gesellschafts- und
Kapitalmarktrecht (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), S 423 – 452.
63 For analysis of the Credit Rating Agencies’ paradox see Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Private
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox’ (2002) University of Illinois
Law Review 1.
64 Mark Carney, ‘Addressing Financial Market Turbulence’, Remarks of the Governor of
the Bank of Canada to the Toronto Board of Trade, 13 March 2008, 3 –4.
65 IMF, Containing Systemic Risks (n 60) 56.
Emilios Avgouleas ECFR 4/2009456
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.194
Download Date | 2/13/14 10:48 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
3.2. Consumer protection
There is a rational choice explanation of the subprime crisis that focuses on
inadequate disclosure of risks, especially once so called ‘teaser’ rates had
ceased and interest payments adjusted to higher rates, and of the mortgage
brokers’ conflicts of interest.66 According to this approach US sub-prime
borrowers did not obtain loans that they could not afford on the basis of their
income, job prospects, and value of their asset, they simply did not have
enough information to make a rational risk analysis of their investment. This
approach is, of course, accurate in explaining the unscrupulous practices of US
mortgage brokers. Yet it also greatly discounts an undisputable fact. US
subprime borrowers were buying into a ‘dream’: the infinite rise of US
housing market. Even if the risks of the mortgage were not properly disclosed
it was not difficult to figure out that US housing price markets were at
historical highs and house price increases could not last forever. Nor was it a
secret to both borrowers and lenders that they borrowed/lent money in excess
of the already over-priced asset’s value. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
inadequate disclosure and sharp practice were the sole culprits of the
explosion of US sub-prime loans.
Collective speculative fever, usually called irrational exuberance and, perhaps,
the inherent inability of a number of consumers, due to low levels of education
and financial expertise, to fully understand the risks involved in the mortgages
they were buying, were possibly more important factors. Mortgage borrowers
in the US and the rest of Western world, anchored to the prevailing
environment of low interest rates and overconfident that rising house prices
would last forever, rushed to jump on the property bandwagon, playing the
‘momentum game’. In doing so they were rather reluctant to engage into
careful calculations regarding the sustainability of their borrowings. The
above essentially mean that overconfidence and inability to make an informed
financial decision were at the heart of consumers’ credit decisions in the
context of sub-prime loans. Thus, it is unlikely that consumers would have
acted much differently had they been given accurate information about the
risks of sub-prime lending and the conflicts of interest of the intermediating
brokers.
66 The Becker-Posner Blog,‘The Subprime Mortgage Mess–Posner’s Comment’, 23
December 2007, available at<http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/12/
the_subprime_mo.html> accessed 24 June 2009.
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III. EC Banking Regulation and Disclosure-based Market Discipline:
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis
1. Market Discipline ‘is not working’?
The chief objective of banking regulation is the protection of systemic stability
and prevention of individual institution collapses.67 The latter is much more
important than in other industries, because bank collapses are highly
contagious and they can evolve, aided by market panic, to full scale financial
cascades threatening the stability of the financial system. In the past twenty
years the regulatory tool that has mostly been relied upon to buttress banking
institutions’ financial health and soundness is capital adequacy standards. The
standards currently applicable to the majority of international banks are those
fashioned by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The third pillar of
the Basel II Accord provides an increased number of regulatory and market
disclosures by regulated banks,68 in order to enhance market discipline.69
It is accurately suggested that the concept of market discipline and its
processes lacks a precise definition,70 and seems to have developed more as the
product of intuition.71 Broadly defined market discipline encompasses the
discipline imposed by shareholders and the market for corporate control on
67 Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (OUP, Oxford 2002, 2nd ed.), ch. 3. Other
commentators add a third objective the minimization of the public cost of bank failures.
See also Charles Goodhart et al. , Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?
(Routledge, London, 1998), ch 1.
68 Under Art. 145 et seq. and Annex XII of Directive 2006/48, which enacted Pillar 3 of the
Basel II Accord in EC Law, EU banks are required under to regularly disclose, inter alia,
(a) the composition of their Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the total amount of capital, and the
accounting policies they use for the valuation of their assets and liabilities, (b) risk
management objectives and policies of each kind of risk, (c) an exposure assessment
comprising information about the asset side of balance sheet, the different types of risk
to which the bank is exposed and the amounts exposed, the method used for calculating
those risks, the external credit agency used for the risk-weighting purposes, in the case
of banks using the standardized approach, and general information on the risk
assessment methodology used, in the case of banks using the Internal Ratings Based
approach and the capital requirements for each different type of risk and the total capital
requirements.
69 ‘See Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord – Third Consultative Paper’, April 2003,
Part 4: The Third Pillar – Market Discipline – A. General Considerations, paras 757 et
seq.
70 David T Llewellyn, ‘Inside the “Black Box” of Market Discipline’ (2005) 25 Economic
Affairs 41.
71 Costas Stephanou, ‘Rethinking Market Discipline’, World Bank Policy Brief, June
2009.
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bank management72 and discipline imposed by subordinated short-term
creditors,73 as well as other creditors,74 by bank customers, and even highly
mobile groups of bank employees.75 All of the above are assumed to have the
right incentives to monitor bank behaviour in order to avoid being caught in a
bank failure and a messy winding up that would bring them large losses. The
most important mechanism to facilitate market discipline is thought to be
disclosure of accurate information to the market, and the market’s ability to
process it properly.76 Also the mix of debt and equity chosen by a bank is
regarded as a serious determinant of the effectiveness of market discipline.77
Pillar 3 of Basle II was premised on a narrower version of market discipline
revolving around the assumption that, if the regulatory capital positions and
risk exposures of banks are regularly disclosed, banks facing difficulties,
because, for instance, they pursue risky business policies, will be restrained/
disciplined by the rest of the market. Thus, disclosure-based market discipline
became one of the most important tools of monitoring and enforcement of
capital adequacy regulation.78
72 Ibid. For a good description of the role of market discipline in corporate governance and
some very convincing arguments about its ineffectiveness see Martin F. Hellwig,
‘Market Discipline, Information Processing and Corporate Governance’, Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint No 2005/19 October 2005.
73 A view that was tentatively based on Charles W Calomiris and Charles M Kahn, ‘The
Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements’ (1991) 81
American Economic Review 497. This analysis focused on the role of demandable bank
debt in disciplining bankers. However, the strength of the countervailing power
possessed by the existence of ‘too big to fail’ banks and deposit insurance was not
accounted for. To account for these limitations Calomiris argued in a subsequent article
for banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance, while at the
same time restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent
banks occurred. See Charles W. Calomiris, ‘Building an Incentive-Compatible Safety
Net’ (1999) 23 Journal of Banking and Finance1499.
74 Donald P Morgan and Kevin J Stiroh, ‘Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the Market
Tough Enough?’ Federal Reserve Board of New York Staff Report No. 95, December
1999. Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=207148>
accessed on 15 June 2009.
75 David T Llewellyn and David G Mayes, ‘What is Market Discipline?’ in George G.
Kaufman, Market Discipline in Banking: Theory and Evidence (Elsevier, 2003), 186 –
188.
76 Ibid. 189– 193. This ability is also severely limited by the discussed above fund
manager’s propensity towards strategic trade behaviour (herding).
77 Adam B. Ashcraft, ‘Does the Market Discipline Banks? New Evidence from the
Regulatory Capital Mix’ FRB of New York Staff Report No. 244, March 2006, available
at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901805> accessed on 1 July
2009.
78 Basle II Framework, Part 4 (n 69).
The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure ParadigmECFR 4/2009 459
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.194
Download Date | 2/13/14 10:48 AM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
It has to be noted that from the outset serious doubts were expressed as to how
well calibrated and reinforcing to the other two pillars of Basle II (capital
requirements and supervisory review) the market discipline pillar was.79 Apart
from those very well argued technical objections, there are a number of more
general reasons that make market discipline an inadequate protection
mechanism both against individual institution failure and against the threat
of systemic collapse. Market discipline works if market monitors have
sufficient incentives and there are no impediments to information signals.80
However, at the individual institution level, a number of perverse incentives
substantially weaken the importance of market discipline. The most
important of these perverse incentives are the possibility of public bank
rescues81 and deposit insurance. Inadequate cover by deposit insurance may
make a bank susceptible to a run, as the Northern Rock incident proved
beyond doubt.82 Thus, deposit insurance fosters systemic stability, albeit it
also weakens market discipline.83
Furthermore, because of the very nature of its business, the banking industry
creates interconnectedness leading to ‘too big to fail’ banks. Since failure of
such banks could create incontrollable ruptures to the financial system,
governments are very unlikely to let them fail. This was made abundantly clear
from the public rescue programmes put in place by various countries during
the global financial crisis. The strong public guarantee obliterates the
restraining force of market discipline. It provides bank management with a
powerful incentive to behave in an imprudent way and expand a banking
institution’s balance sheet, since the larger the institution becomes and the
more inter-connected the more likely is that its failure will also drag down
other big (inter-connected) financial institutions necessitating a public
rescue.84 In addition, bank creditors will continue lending it funds without
79 See David Van Hoose, ‘Market Discipline and Supervisory Discretion in Banking:
Reinforcing or Conflicting Pillars of Basel II?’ Networks Financial Institute, Working
Paper 06/ 2007, February 2007. Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper-
s.cfm?abstract_id=985659> accessed on 20 June 2009.
80 Llewellyn and Mayes (n 75) 190.
81 Ibid. 191. E.g. , evidence from the bond markets well before the implementation of Basel
II showed that bond-markets were taking a softer approach to big banks assuming that
they were too big to fail or they were simply to complex in their structure for the bond
market to understand and price effectively. See Morgan and Stiroh (n 74).
82 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007– 08, The Run
on the Rock (24 January 2008).
83 Inter-American Development Bank, ‘Unlocking Credit: the Quest for Deep and Stable
Bank Lending – Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 2005 Report’ (2004)
ch. 7.
84 The Geneva Report calls this risk the ‘interconnectedness spillover’ (n 29) 20– 21.
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any substantial fear of losses that any financial institution’s bankruptcy would
entail, significantly weakening market discipline.
Moreover, even if it was possible to eliminate moral hazard and design
appropriate incentives so that, at least, bank creditors became effective
monitors of banks, in which case extensive market disclosure would have been
very useful, still market monitoring would mean little in terms of preventing
institutional failures and/or safeguarding systemic stability for two reasons.
First, as Hellwig accurately notes85:
Because of systemic interdependence, the individual bank’s risk exposure cannot be
ascertained by just looking at the bank’s assets and liabilities, on balance sheet and off
balance sheet. If the bank’s asset position involves a certain risk and the bank has hedged this
risk by contracting with a third party, the effectiveness of the hedge depends on the third
party’s ability to fulfil its obligations when needed. If the risk in question is of
macroeconomic dimension, an interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, or a housing-price
risk, the counterparty’s ability to fulfil its obligation depends on how many similar contracts
it has concluded with other market participants. If risk correlations across contracts are such
that the counterparty to the hedge must deliver on many of them at the same time, this in
itself may destroy the counterparty’s viability.
In today’s globalized markets, there is no private institution that possibly has
the ability, resources, and access to information to be able to conduct a risk
analysis of all financial institutions, regulated and unregulated. Even if such
institution existed, the colossal costs of universal monitoring would far exceed
the expected benefits.
Moreover, due to, first, banks’ susceptibility to runs, second, to business
competition reasons, and, third, to various confidentiality agreements, crucial
data on a bank’s business and performance/profitability of certain business
relationship, will never be made public on a disaggregated manner.86 As a
result, the effectiveness of individual institution monitoring by the market on
the basis of disclosed data becomes of much lesser importance. Especially in
the case of mega-banks, which are normally very complex financial
conglomerates with opaque structures, the market’s ability to price properly
the risk of the bank may face insurmountable obstacles.
Finally, market discipline is no protection against systemic risk. First, there is
a serious possibility that the disclosed information itself is unhelpful, as is the
case with information disclosed under the highly pro-cyclical mark to market
85 Hellwig (n 30) 59– 60. Hellwig accurately notes that: ‘The difficulties that the monoline
insurers of credit risk in mortgage-backed securities have had over the past year – or the
more recent crisis of AIG – provide a telling example of the problem.’ Id.
86 In fact, such information is respectively regarded by the EC Directive 2006/49 as
‘proprietary’ or ‘confidential’. Annex XII, paras 2 –3.
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accounting standards.87 Second, even if a financial institution behaves
individually in a prudent way, or even if all financial institutions behave in a
prudent, but un-coordinated, way a systemic crisis may not be averted.
Especially in the event of a liquidity crunch, even the prudent behaviour of one
financial institution can create spillovers that may undermine the stability of
other institutions leading to systemic instability. This problem is due to
another (risk-spillover) externality: Fire-sales.88 According to the Geneva
Report:
[T]he fire-sale externality arises since each individual financial institution does not take into
account the price impact its own fire-sales will have on asset prices in a possible future
liquidity crunch. Hence, fire-sales by some institutions spillover, and adversely affect the
balance sheet of others, causing a negative externality.
At the same time, the market focusing on disclosed data showing that an
individual institution (or a number of institutions) in distress behaves in a
prudent way, namely, sells assets to lower its leverage, would react in an
assured and complacent way, although a financial catastrophe could be
imminent. Therefore, EU policy-makers should become more pragmatic
about the true benefits of disclosure-based market discipline and more
creative in terms of new regulatory strategies ensuring systemic stability and
controlling the ‘too big to fail’ phenomenon.
2. Whither Reform for EU Banking Regulation
As mentioned in the introduction there is underway a major initiative at the
EU level to restructure and reform cross-border financial supervisory
structures. Relevant reforms follow the recommendations of the de Larosiere
Committee and have led to the establishment of: (a) European Systemic Risk
Council (ESRC), chaired by the European Central Bank, which will monitor
and assess risks to the stability of the financial system as a whole, so-called
‘macro-prudential supervision’; (b) a European System of Financial Super-
visors (ESFS), which is assigned the task of supervising individual financial
institutions, so-called ‘micro-prudential supervision’; and of (c) three new
87 Geneva Report (n 29).
88 This externality was first explained in a model in John Geanakoplos and Heracles
Polemarchakis, ‘Existence, Regularity, and Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive
Allocation When the Asset Market is Incomplete’ in Heller, Starr, Starrett (eds),
Uncertainty, Information and Communication, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow,
Vol. 3, (CUP, 1986) .
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European Supervisory Authorities that will replace the three existing EU
supervisory networks operating under the Lamfalussy process.89
The ESRC will, inter alia, operate as an early warning system making, where
necessary, recommendations for action to deal with emerging systemic risks.
It is thought that the establishment of the ESRC will address one of the
fundamental weaknesses in EU financial architecture, as exposed by the global
financial crisis: the vulnerability of the financial system to interconnected,
complex, sectoral and cross-sectoral systemic risks. The ESRC will not have
legally binding powers. However, it is expected that its warnings and
recommendations will be taken very seriously by national governments and
other addressees. Thus, in order to enhance their effectiveness those
recommendations will be made public. However, in the most critical of
circumstances, when in the context of a cross-border bank crisis ESRC’s
intervention will be needed most, because safeguarding the interests of
national stakeholders would reign supreme for the home country authorities,
the fact that ESRC’s recommendations are not binding may prove an obstacle
to their effectiveness.
On the other hand, the ESFS will have a much more formal supervisory role.
According to the Commission: ‘the ESFS is to be built on shared and
mutually-reinforcing responsibilities, combining nationally-based supervi-
sion of firms with specific tasks at the European level. It aims to foster
harmonised rules and coherent supervisory practice and enforcement.’90 The
ESFS will comprise representatives of national financial supervisors, of the
new European Supervisory Authorities, and of the Commission and will work
in tandem with the new European Supervisory Authorities.91
The new European Supervisory Authorities are established as European
agencies with formal legal powers under EU Law and will have the power to:
co-ordinate the work of national supervisors, arbitrate between national
supervisors in supervisory colleges in case of disagreement on supervisory
issues regarding a cross-border financial institution; take steps to harmonise
national regulatory rules and move towards a common European rulebook;
directly supervise certain pan-European institutions which are regulated at
EU level, such as Credit Rating Agencies.
89 The Lamfalussy Committees are: the Committee of European Securities Supervisors
(CESR), the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS), and the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions (CEIOPS).
90 EU Commission Press Release, ‘Financial services: Commission proposes stronger
financial supervision in Europe’, 27 May 2009, IP/09/836.
91 Council Conclusions (n 2) 8.
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Inspite of the above very useful reforms, EU policy-makers have not
considered yet the issue of disclosure-based market discipline. As explained in
the preceding sections, disclosure-based market discipline is in-sufficient to
enforce the prudent operation of individual institutions and to protect the
financial system from the risk of contagion. It will remain a strong supervisory
tool only if it is used to supplement the impact of protective rules.
Proposals for the introduction of restraining protective regulation in banking
markets include calls for the imposition of dynamic pre-provisioning
obligations, so that banks set aside more capital in good times in order to
restrain the credit flows to the economy that may feed asset bubbles,92 other
measures for counter-cyclical financial reporting,93 and of an upper level
(maximum gross) leverage ratio for banks.94 Furthermore, academic com-
mentators have suggested that inherent moral hazard in the banking industry,
the cognitive limitations of human actors, corporate governance failures, and
the inability of disclosure to solve any of these problems call for the
imposition of restrictions on the kind of business activities savings and loans
banks should undertake. The same commentators have called for the
imposition of limits on the use of securitisation by commercial banks and of
their exposure to the capital markets.95
Such restrictions would of course herald a radical transformation of
regulatory thinking in this field at a global level, as reforms with a domestic
focus are bound to prove ineffective due to regulatory arbitrage. They would
also mean the separation of commercial banking from ‘casino banking’, as the
Turner Review calls the capital market activities of banks.96 At the EU level,
where the mega-bank model has been happily embraced and championed by
the Banking Directives,97 due to the continental European tradition and the
influence of the Basle Accords, adoption of the above proposals would mean a
radical reconceptualization of the prevailing bank business model that may be
authorized to operate at a pan-European level.
92 Geneva Report (n 29) 35, 38– 39, 59 – 60.
93 See Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs, Press Release 7
July 2009, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ecofin/109064.pdf>.
94 Turner Review (n 52) 7, 53, 95, 118.
95 For a first approach and the description of this new licensing/supervisory model for the
banking industry see Avgouleas (n 19) 149– 150.
96 Turner Review (n 52) 43, 94.
97 Second Council (EEC) Directive 89/646 [1989] OJ L 386/1, replaced by Council (EC)
Directive 2006/48 [2006] OJ L 177. The Second Banking Directive allowed deposit-
taking European Banks to also engage in the kind of investment market activities that
were usually reserved, at least outside of Germany, for securities firms and non-deposit
taking investment banks.
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IV. Reform of the EU Retail Investor Protection Framework
1. What is the Case for Reform?
None of disclosure’s limitations diminishes its importance in securities
regulation. They just call for a radical rethinking of the disclosure paradigm.
Disclosure’s undisputable benefits include battling market abuse and
democratizing capital markets, which has encouraged access to them and
fostered liquid markets. A good example of an area of securities regulation
where more disclosure is required is the regulation of short sales.98 Apart from
the obvious benefits of increased market transparency, uniform disclosure
standards in the field of short sales may both play a stabilizing role in times of
market turbulence99 and provide the template for further harmonisation of
trading rules in EU securities markets.100
Given the wide range of lessons that may be drawn from the global financial
crisis, discussed in section II, and the impact of cognitive biases or irrational
exuberance on investor decision-making, in the field of retail investor
protection, there is arguably, a need for the overhaul of the disclosure regimes
provided by the EC Securities Directives. This is especially the case with
regard to the extensive retail investor protection regime provided by
MiFID.101 As explained in section IV.3 below, relevant reforms may not be
limited to changes of disclosure techniques, volume, and format changes.
They should be more far reaching and consider the feasibility of insertion of
default options in certain retail financial products and the establishment of a
Pan-European financial products Committee. Arguably, this means that
disclosure regulation reform should be guided by empirical and experimental
studies,102 which should measure the actual impact of disclosed information,
98 See FSA, Discussion Paper 09/1, ‘Short Selling’, February 2009.
99 Ibid.
100 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Vexed Issue of Short Sales Regulation: Why Prohibition is
Inefficient and Disclosure Insufficient’, Working Paper, 29 May 2009, available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411615> accessed on 2 July
2009.
101 MiFID has created a wide-ranging retail investor protection regime for the provision of
investment services, including the provision of investment advice, based on a host of
provisions regulating conflict of interests, client suitability, disclosure of information
to retail customers, best execution, and client order handling. See Maloney (n 1) 542 –
553, and for excellent analysis of the role of disclosure in MiFID’s retail investor regime
id. 591 – 608.
102 The value of experimental studies in testing financial regulation has also been stressed
in the context of laws designed to limit market imperfections such as asset price bubbles
within complex adaptive markets. See Erik F. Gerding, ‘Laws Against Bubbles: An
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and thus the effectiveness of disclosure rules.As Julia Black has accurately
observed: ‘Regulators have to have knowledge about retail investors’ skills,
knowledge, behaviour and needs if they are to design regulation which
provides them with appropriate protections.’103
2. Can Economic Experiments Help?
Experimental economics focuses on an ecological concept of rationality,
which asks questions as to why a specific social practice, or a specific game, has
been chosen instead of another. Thus, experimental tests are suitable to
measure the impact of disclosure rules on investor decisions and market
efficiency. Testing how expert and lay investors process, utilize, and
strategically use disclosed information in the context of financial markets, in
order to measure the impact of disclosure rules, will require highly complex
and sophisticated experiments conducted by a broad alliance of lawyers,
economists, psychologists, and regulators. As a result, relevant teams will
probably present serious co-ordination issues. Furthermore, such experi-
ments in order to have credibility they must engage real life investors, traders
and other human participants trying to observe how these react to different
pieces of information and what is the result of their reaction in terms of market
outcomes. Naturally, conducting experiments with real life actors will require
expending considerable public resources. Overall the number of experiments
attempting to explain market actors’ behaviour, including the way they react
to differential volume of disclosed information, is on the rise.104 Furthermore,
as a recent experiment on herding behaviour in financial markets – conducted
by IMF economists using market professionals – has shown the use of
experiments in this context is both feasible and very useful to test theoretical
assumptions.105
Nonetheless, the use of experiments to test the impact of disclosure rules will
not prove unproblematic. Strong evidence points to the fact that individuals
Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to Financial Regulation’ (2007) Wiskonsin Law
Review 977.
103 Julia Black, ‘Involving Consumers in Securities Regulation’, A Report prepared for the
IDA Taskforce to Modernize Securities Regulation in Canada, 23 June 2006, 89.
104 E.g. , John Beshears, James J Choi et al. , ‘How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect
Individuals’ Mutual Fund Choices?’ 11 September 2008, available at <http://
www.som.yale.edu/faculty/jjc83/summaryprospectus.pdf> accessed on 20 June 2009.
105 See Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino ‘Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: An
Experiment with Financial Market Professionals’ IMF Working Paper 141/08, June
2008. Their research comes to validate to some degree older experimental evidence on
the impact of herding. See Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt, ‘Information
Cascades in the Laboratory’ (1997) 87 American Economic Review 847.
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do not use exclusively unitary processes of decision-making, as rational choice
and prospect theory hold, but rely instead on multiple processes,106
‘complicates efforts to derive broad normative policy prescriptions from
isolated experimental results.’107 Also, in terms of methodology, experiment-
ers should comply with all six criteria set for successful experimental testing of
legal rules: Control, Internal Validity, Falsifiability of Theory, Replicability,
External Validity and Contextual Attentiveness.108
A plausible objection that may be raised here is regarding the need of
experiments. Is it not enough to just conduct empirical studies? The answer to
this objection is rather straightforward. First, experimental evidence shall be
used to complement, verify or nullify empirical research and not as a self-
standing body of evidence. Second, since what is really required to be
identified here is why market actors behave in particular way, while in
possession of full information, rather than how market actors behave in the
same circumstances, such evidence is difficult to be derived from empirical
studies. Third, assessing how market actors process information is a rather
complex issue and will also require the conduct of qualitative studies
(interviews, questionnaires) to accompany/interpret empirical data observa-
tions. However, qualitative studies in this context are open to manipulation by
the subjects of the study, who will probably lie in many contexts in order to
present themselves much more ‘clever’, alert, or rational and much less prone
to peer pressure than their actual market behaviour would indicate. On the
other hand, in the controlled environment of an experiment, using real life
subjects, many of these problems may be overcome. This makes experiments
very useful and reliable method to gauge the actual impact of disclosed
information on market actors’ behaviour, though their results shall be a useful
basis for law reform only if they are corroborative with the findings of
empirical studies.
It is hoped that, following the conduct of the discussed extensive empirical and
experimental studies, a new framework for the use of disclosure, as a
regulatory technique in capital markets, will emerge. One of the thorniest
questions that experiments on the effectiveness of disclosure regulation must
address relates to whether disclosure is sufficient with respect to certain classes
of retail investors, who present limited financial sophistication and are also at
the lower ranks of the earnings and education ladder? On the basis of present
evidence, there is room for a prediction that experiments may lead to the
conclusion that disclosure of information under whatever format or technique
106 Arlen and Talley (n 41) xxviii.
107 Ibid xviii.
108 Ibid xxxii.
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may have to be complemented by soft paternalism mechanisms,109 such as
default investment/savings options,110 in order to facilitate welfare enhancing
decision-making by such investors. Default options, in turn, may be chosen by
a public or other non-profit consumer body in relevant financial contracts.
The assumption that simply modifying the volume of disclosed information
may have an imperceptible impact on investor behaviour is re-enforced by a
recent experiment conducted by Laibson, Choi et al on the way individuals
may use the proposed by the SEC ‘summary prospectus’ to be issued by
mutual funds. The main objective of this proposal was to improve retail
investors’ processing and digestion of product information, something that is
not usually possible with the bulky and very detailed full prospectus that
mutual funds are obliged to issue. The experiment, where subjects were
Harvard staff, showed that ‘the Summary Prospectus [did] not meaningfully
alter subjects’ investment choices. Average portfolio fees and past returns
[were] similar whether or not subjects receive[d] the Summary Prospectus.’
The welfare gains the authors identified were in relation to spending less time
to read the prospectus and wasting less paper, not exactly the gains intended
by the SEC when it proposed the Summary Prospectus.111
If we assume that the findings of this experiment are robust and may be
replicated then initiatives such as the imposition of a requirement, by recast
Directive 85/611/EC,112 on UCITS management companies and UCITS
sellers and advisors to provide a document called ‘Key Investor Information’
(‘KII’),113 to replace the ‘simplified prospectus’ may have limited effectiveness.
109 Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff et al. ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”’ (2003) 151 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1211. For an analysis of possible uses of soft paternalism
mechanisms to protect investors see Emilios Avgouleas, ’Reforming Investor
Protection Regulation: The Impact of Cognitive Biases’, in Michael Faure and Frank
Stephen (eds), Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation in Honour of Anthony
Ogus (Hague: Intersentia, 2008), 143 – 176.
110 From the ever expanding literature on the effect of defaults on savings planning see
James J Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, ‘Optimal
Defaults’ (2003) 93 American Economic Review, 180—185 and by the same authors
‘For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior’ in David A.
Wise (ed.), Perspectives in the Economics of Aging (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2004). For the active choice of defaults by the financially literate see Gabriel D
Carroll, James J Choi, David Laibson,
Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, ‘Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions’
(2009) 124 Quarterly Journal of Economics (forthcoming, November 2009).
111 See Beshears, Choi et al. (n 104).
112 Recast UCITS Directive (n 22).
113 Section 3 of the recast UCITS Directive. Art 78(1) of the recast UCITS Directive
provides that: ‘Member States shall require that an investment company and, for each
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However, the Commission’s initiative per se constitutes a very welcome
change of attitude to the one size fits all disclosure documents of previous
Directives. The same applies to EU Commission’s willingness to test ex ante
with consumers (through interviews undertaken by two specialized contrac-
tors) the effectiveness of this new document.114 This shows that EU regulators
have increasingly become very receptive to the benefits that extensive
empirical and experimental studies may bring in the field of retail investor
regulation.
of the common funds it manages, a management company draw up a short document
containing key information for investors. That document shall be referred to as ’key
investor information’ in this Directive.’ With regard to the content of the ‘Key Investor
information’ the recast UCITS Directive provides: ‘2. Key investor information shall
include appropriate information about the essential characteristics of the UCITS
concerned, which is to be provided to investors so that they are reasonably able to
understand the nature and the risks of the investment product that is being offered to
them and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis.3. Key
investor information shall provide information on the [investment’s] essential elements
. . . Those essential elements shall be comprehensible to the investor without any
reference to other documents.’ Id. As regards the format of ‘Key Investor Information’
document, Recital 59 of the recast UCITS Directive provides: ‘Key investor
information should be presented in a short format. A single document of limited
length presenting the information in a specified sequence is the most appropriate
manner in which to achieve the clarity and simplicity of presentation that is required by
retail investors, and should allow for useful comparisons, notably of costs and risk
profile, relevant to the investment decision’.
114 IFF Research and YouGov, ‘Executive Summary: Research on KII Disclosures for
UCITS Products, Prepared for European Commission’, 28 October 2008, available at
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/other_docs/keyinvestor_ex-
e_summary_en.pdf>. This report discusses the results of Phase 1 of testing of key
concepts of the ‘KII’ document. This is how the report describes the objectives of the
research and its methodology: ‘The [research] consortium . . . undertake a detail review
of the effectiveness of new forms of disclosure for UCITS funds to replace the
simplified prospectus. . . the research design covers two inter-related phases of work.
Phase one, based around both qualitative and quantitative research methods aims to:
test the individual variants that constitute the core elements of a KII – strategy and
objectives; risk and reward, performance; and charges . . . and to make recommen-
dations for how to improve these variants in the second stage of the work. The second
phase of the work seeks to test two fully mocked-up documents, the design and content
of which is informed by evidence gathered in phase one . . .’ Id. See also EU
Commission, ‘Workshop on Key Investor Information (KII) Brussells, 20 October
2008 Summary Conclusions’, 29 October 2008, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/investment/docs/other_docs/keyinvestor_summary_en.pdf>.
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3. Two Proposals for Reform
3.1. Pluralism in Investor Protection Rules
Arguably, if the requested above experimental and empirical studies verify the
discussed limitations of disclosure, then with respect to retail investor markets
EU legislators have two options in to improve the effectiveness of disclosure.
The first option is to keep relying on the force of disclosure but as regards
provision of issuer information, offer of investment advice, and investment
promotions create a more pluralistic investor protection regime than that
mandated by MiFID, the Prospectus II, and UCITS Directives. The second
reform option, which may be used to either complement or substitute (apart
from the field of mandatory disclosure in securities regulation) the first policy
measure is the establishment of an independent Pan-European commission
for financial products. Such commission should scrutinize savings and
investment products addressed to the retail investor market and recommend
default options.
As regards, the first option, in the field of investment advice and investment
promotions, it seems plausible that individual investor classification systems
should become more pluralistic allowing for a larger number of investor
categories. Such increase would better reflect the fact that there is a serious
heterogeneity within the retail investor body and that, depending on their
investment sophistication and expertise, individual investors are susceptible to
cognitive biases to a different degree.115 In fact, the definition of ‘retail client’
(investor) in Art 4(12) of MiFID as somebody who is not a professional client,
and the fact that public investor is regarded by the Prospectus Directive II (by
implication) as any investor who is not a ‘qualified investor’,116 shows how
fluid and ripe is this class of investors for specification and further
categorization.
Accordingly, the suggested division should be based on the dual assumption
that experts normally avoid many (but not all) of the cognitive errors of lay
(retail) investors and that within the general group of lay (retail) investors
wider classification is possible based on their investment experience, track
record, education, financial resources, and even psychological preferences.117
115 Jeffrey J Rachlinski, ‘Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism’ (2006)
University of Chicago Law Review 207, 216– 224.
116 See above n 23.
117 As Professor Cunningham suggests, individual investors may have their psychological
profile taken and their psychological attitude to risk identified and recorded in the
context of suitability tests which are already carried out by broker-dealers in
compliance with existing conduct of business regulations. Lawrence Cunningham,
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The identification of biases in the investment decisions of individuals and of
institutions, in order to allow for more pluralistic investor categorization,
would require a lengthy and large-scale study by psychologists, economists,
and regulators of investor choices and of their trading behaviour. Serious
objections have been raised as to whether such categorization is at all possible,
due to difficulties in identifying and separating expert from non-expert
investors.118 However, given that most investors follow specific trading
patterns, certain objective characteristics of trading and investment habits can
emerge without serious difficulty. In addition, this gigantic exercise may be
less costly than it appears at first glance, since the data that needs to be
collected is already at the disposal of investment firms.119 Finally, the
processing of relevant data could be conducted without revealing individuals’
identities, protecting thus individual investor privacy.
The suggested increase of investor classes recognized in disclosure and
conduct of business regulation would not necessarily place a significant new
burden on financial services firms in the EU, for two reasons. First, MiFID
already separates investors into retail clients, professional clients, and eligible
counterparties.120 Although the third group concerns exclusively financial
institutions, the other two are not as clear-cut as they seem. There is a class of
individuals, who based on their investment experience may be categorized as
professional clients, enjoying thus a lower level of protection.121 Secondly,
computerization, amortization, and increased sophistication on the part of
compliance professionals would help investment firms to comply with new
rules at an imperceptible expense, absorbing the initial costs that measures
such as the narrow categorisation of investors would entail.
Furthermore, expanding investor categorization seems to be the only
immediate remedy in the case of mandatory disclosure. Since disclosure
‘may not protect investors if cognitive biases prevent them from rationally
incorporating the information disclosed into their investment decisions’,122
the limitations of bounded rationality should be resolved through the
‘Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance’ (2002) Washington & Lee Law Review
767, 800– 807.
118 See Stephen J. Choi and Adam C Pritchard, ‘Behavioral Economics and the SEC’,
Berkeley School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 115, 2003,
66– 68, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=500203>.
119 In this area very interesting are efforts by the Canadian government to develop ‘a
national Investor Index’ which provides ‘data on retail investors’ skills, needs,
behaviour and awareness’ of applicable regulation. As Julia Black accurately notes:
‘The database should enable analysis across different demographic groups’ making it
more usable and precise. Black (n 103) 8.
120 MiFID, Annex II.
121 MiFID, Anex II.ii.1.
122 Choi and Pritchard, (n 118) 4, 22– 23.
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adoption of other strategies. Thus, a good debiasing technique would be
increased pluralism (fragmentation) of investor classes and appropriate
modification of the format and volume of information addressed to each
class of investors. Namely, firms instead of producing single format disclosure
prospectuses or one set of other disclosure or marketing documents would
have to produce several in varied formats depending on the kind of investor
each document is addressed to. Of course, all classes of investors should have
access to all documents.
3.2. An EU Financial Products Agency
It may be plausibly assumed that tailor made disclosure regimes for various
sub-classes in the retail investor class may prove unfeasible or very expensive.
At the same time, in the absence of a default option, disclosure of information
alone, in whatever format or volume, may not be enough to counter
individuals’ general exhibition of limited self-control and tendency to prefer
instant gratification over long-term rewards, which, of course, fosters
speculation. Therefore, if outside the field of securities offers, insertion of
default options in retail financial contracts is the more cost-effective and
realistic of the two reforms suggested here, then the next question is who
should have the duty to scrutinize financial products targeting the unsophis-
ticated retail investor market.
Harvard Professor Elizabeth Warren suggested in an article in 2007 that the
US mortgage catastrophe would have been averted if there was an independent
financial products watchdog guarding against hazardous financial products
such as adjustable rate subprime mortgages.123 This is an idea that has been
embraced by US Congress124 and adopted by the Obama administration in US
Treasury’s June 2009 proposals for the reform of financial regulation and
supervision.125 Thus, there is an expectation that legislation will soon be
introduced in the US establishing an independent financial products
commission.
123 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Unsafe at Any Rate’ (2007) Democracy a Journal of Ideas, available
at <http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6528> accessed on 30 June
2009.
124 Durbin, Schumer, Kennedy ask Treasury to Support Creation of a Financial Product
Safety Commission’ Press Release, April 24, 2009, available at <http://schumer.se-
nate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=311958>.
125 US Treasury Department, ‘Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation:
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation’, 18 June 2009.
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Of course, the EU did not have a subprime mortgages scandal. On the other
hand, it has an ageing population with pressing investment for retirement
needs. In addition, there is no evidence that lay EU citizens exhibit a level of
financial sophistication higher than that observed among the general
population in the US. Individuals and households in the UK126 and in Central
and Eastern European countries127 proved to be as capable of crippling over-
indebtedness and high loan to asset value (LTV) mortgages (usually
considered to be an over 75% LTV) as their US counterparts. It should be
noted that increased indebtedness may not only have a serious impact on
financial stability, but also heightens the sensitivity of households’ well being
to changes in interest rates, income and asset prices.128 This means that, in
times of crisis, household income and asset prices may experience a sudden
drop making debt service problematic and posing all kinds of systemic,
economic, and social problems.
In addition, just expecting brokers and other financial advisors to act as
champions of consumer protection for their clients, based on MiFID’s
investor suitability regulations and other conduct of business rules,129 which
126 UK household indebtedness stood in 2004 at 140 % of aggregate household income,
just over 1trillion GBP. The ratio in 1994 was just 105 % of aggregate household
income. In 2008, 4 years later, household debt in the UK had exceeded 150 % of
aggregate household income and stood at 1,6 trillion GBP, an average of 60,000 GBP
per household. See Orla May et al. , Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, 2004,
‘British Household Indebtedness and Financial Stress: A Household-level Picture’,
available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=699225> accessed
on 4 July 2009. and Tomas Hellnbrandt et al. , Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q4,
2008, ‘The Financial Position of British Households: Evidence from the 2008 NMG
Research Survey’, 384– 384, available at <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica-
tions/quarterlybulletin/qb080401.pdf> accessed on 10 July 2009.
The same 2008 survey points outs to the large number of borrowers with high LTV
mortgages
127 For the exponential growth of individual and household debt in the Baltic countries
and Eastern Europe, which, eventually, along with unsustainable external public debt
sown the seeds for the present crisis of their national economies see ‘Consumer
Borrowing May Hit Future Growth’, Emerging Europe Monitor, Section: Economy/
Romania, January 2004; ‘Credit Book or Credit Bust?’ Emerging Europe Monitor,
Section: Economy/Lithuania, July 2005. Available at <http://www.emergingeurope-
monitor.com> accessed on 10 July 2009.
128 See Guy Debelle, ‘Household Debt and the Macroeconomy’ Bank of International
Settlements Quarterly Review, Special Features, March 2004, 51– 63, available at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0403e.pdf> accessed on 10 July 2009.
129 For an overview Christos Gortsos, ‘MiFID’s Investor Protection Regime: Best
Execution of Client Orders and Related Conduct of Business Rules’ in Emilios
Avgouleas (ed.), The Regulation of Investment Services in Europe under MiFID:
Implementation and Practice (Tottel Publishing, 2008) ch. 5.
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oblige providers and sellers of financial products to disclose as much
information as possible for the products’ nature and risk and ascertain
whether it is suitable for the customer’s risk profile, is a plausible but possibly
inadequate protection mechanism. First, relevant rules do not always work
properly, because of broker/financial advisor expected tendency to avoid
complying with them, where possible, no less due to the complexity of
relevant rules. Second, due to the explained above limited ability of consumers
to understand what is disclosed and act on such information in a rational way,
retail investors may not make full or proper use of disclosed information.
Therefore, an independent watchdog that would advise, scrutinize, and
recommend options for financial products, rather than regulate them or
prohibit them from entering the market, could be, on the basis of the
preceding discussion, a very positive development. However, given the
structure of the internal market for financial services and the ability of
financial services firms to offer financial products on a cross-border basis, such
an agency would be effective only if it has a formal pan-European standing.
V. Conclusion
The old disclose and self-regulate paradigm in financial markets has been
widely castigated as among the main culprits of the current global financial
catastrophe. However, this does not diminish the value of disclosure as
regulatory technique; it simply calls for a radical rethinking of its uses,
processes, volume, timing, and format, in order to make it more effective and
better adapted to actual market conditions. This article has attempted to map
disclosure’s future in European financial regulation on the basis of lessons
learnt from the global financial crisis.
The article has argued that premising EU banking regulation on disclosure-
based market discipline was a flawed approach. Disclosure can have an
effective role in EC banking regulation only as a supplement to strict
protective rules that limit the kind of activities an institution may undertake
and restrain its risk-taking appetite. Furthermore, it has been suggested that
the disclosure conundrum in EC securities regulation shall only be resolved if
disclosure rules are subjected to extensive and rigorous empirical and
experimental studies.
It is possible that such studies will show that, inspite of mandating extensive
disclosure regimes, certain classes of individual investors simply need to either
be granted pluralistic (almost tailor made disclosure regimes) or be aided by
the identification of default choices in retail financial contracts. The latter may
prove to be the preferred solution both in terms of costs and retail investor
protection effectiveness, especially in a region like the EU with a rapidly
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ageing population that has to save ever more and invest ever more
productively for what looks an uncertain financial future in retirement.
Finally, the role of scrutinizing retail financial contracts and identifying
default options should be assigned to an independent pan-European body that
is less susceptible to regulatory capture than national authorities.
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